In 'Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing' Joona Räsänen argues that Christopher Kaczor's objections to Giubilini and Minerva's position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Räsänen's criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor's strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Räsänen's criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor's arguments, as well as adding some of our own.
| I NTR OD U CTI ON
Giubilini and Minerva's well-known article 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' presents a case for their view that 'killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be'.
1 They label infanticide as 'after-birth abortion' to emphasize the moral equivalence between it and abortion, based on their belief that fetuses and infants have similar moral status, lacking the cognitive properties necessary to be regarded as persons with an accompanying right to life.
An early chapter in Kaczor's most recent edition of his book 'The
Ethics of Abortion' 2 addresses infanticide, and in it he briefly offers four objections to Giubilini and Minerva's arguments. Räsänen's paper 3 consists of a detailed examination of each of Kaczor's objections, but
Räsänen seems unaware that Kaczor is not mounting a comprehensive attack on Giubilini and Minerva in the few pages of this short critique.
Kaczor provides additional support for his objections later in the same chapter, but Räsänen does not address the points raised. Additionally, many of the detailed arguments Kaczor subsequently develops against abortion are equally applicable against infanticide, and so his four objections taken in isolation are not representative of the true strength of his case against infanticide.
Here we reply to each of Räsänen's objections, drawing on the full range of Kaczor's arguments, as well as adding some of our own.
| F I RST OBJ EC TI ON: C ONTR OV ER SI A L P R EM I SE S
The first objection to infanticide that Räsänen 4 critiques is Kaczor's claim that Giubilini and Minerva argue from controversial practices to support even more controversial practices. The moral permissibility of embryonic stem cell research, abortion, and capital punishment is still debated, and so to draw the conclusion from this that 'after-birth abortion' is morally permissible is all the more controversial. at-least first-trimester abortions. 14 The addition of pain to the act of killing therefore provides an additional reason to consider a late-term abortion to be worse than an earlier one, without needing to concede that the intuition is based on differences in the fundamental moral status of the prenatal human.
The intuition that late-term abortions are worse than earlier ones may also be due to increased maternal-fetal attachment (MFA). MFA describes the relationship between a mother and her developing fetus. 15 The increase in gestational age is strongly correlated with an increase in MFA 16 which helps to explain why miscarriages later in pregnancy are seen as being more traumatic than earlier ones. Because the MFA between a mother and her child increases throughout pregnancy it may be considered morally worse to intentionally end a relationship with a greater degree of attachment than it would have been to do so earlier. Kaczor 17 gives the example of the more serious loss associated with ending a marriage after four decades compared with ending it after four weeks.
Nevertheless, the presence or absence of a degree of attachment does not justify killing another human being. Therefore, there are plau- worse than an earlier one is predicated on extrinsic differences that can be embraced by proponents of the SV, without compromising the equal moral status of all humans throughout their developmental journeys. Would Räsänen consider this support for the SV? Birthdays rather than conception days are chosen for pragmatic reasons; conception is hard to measure accurately, whereas birth is tangible and easy to record; a birthday also signifies survival of the inherent risks associated with pregnancy and birth and is unrelated to the ontological nature of the pre/post-natal human. Rather than being 'ludicrous', stating that 'I was never born' remains a legitimate reductio of body-self dualism.
Räsänen then appeals to a modified formulation of the embryo rescue argument (ERA) employed to demonstrate that the SV leads to odd conclusions. Given the choice between saving a 10-year-old boy and 10 frozen human embryos from dying, the proponent of the SV, he says, is committed to saving the 10 frozen human embryos and letting the 10-year-old die. This he argues is 'at least as odd a conclusion as accepting infanticide'.
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It does not seem a strong argument to claim that an opposing view entails a position as odd as your own. In any case, we reject his assertion that the SV commits us to saving the 10 frozen human embryos instead of the 10-year-old, even though we agree with Räsänen that under the SV that it is better to save 10 human persons than one, ceteris paribus. The SV does entail that all human persons have equal intrinsic value, which is the value something has for its own sake.
Nevertheless, there may be other prudent or pragmatic reasons that would warrant choosing to save either in the ERA. For instance, if a doctor at the burning clinic is the mother of the 10-year-old or the embryos, it does not seem at all immoral, or unreasonable for the mother to save her own progeny. 22 Similarly an expert in reproductive technology working at the burning clinic strongly suspects that the embryos have little chance of surviving once removed from the clinic and so opts to save the 10-year-old.
This demonstrates that other intrinsic goods, instrumental goods, and agent-relative reasons can also inform ethical decision making.
Regardless, the example is disanalogous to infanticide because the embryo rescue case is a dilemma where one is choosing whom to save.
Whereas with infanticide one is choosing who it is permissible to kill.
Choosing either option in the embryo rescue case therefore does not entail that one would be justified in killing whomever one chose not to save. Neither choice undermines the SV that all humans have equal intrinsic value, and so Räsänen is mistaken to claim that proponents of the SV are committed to only saving the embryos in the ERA.
We have responded to each of Räsänen's arguments against the SV, and concluded that they cannot be sustained. We also note that Räsänen does not respond to Kaczor's criticism that body-self dualism leads to absurd conclusions, preferring to attack the SV. We conclude that Kaczor's second objection to Giubilini and Minerva's defense of infanticide remains legitimate. or understands that they have a continuous existence over time. For most people, permitting infanticide at 12 months of age is disturbing.
| OBJ E CTI ON 3 : E QU A L M OR A L WOR TH A N D T HE D EV E LOP M EN TA L P ROC ESS
As with Kaczor's previous objections, Räsänen does not engage with the full range of Kaczor's arguments, confining himself to responding to the very brief discussion addressing Giubilini and Minerva's views early in Kaczor's book. He does not mount a persuasive critique of Kaczor's position on using degreed characteristics for personhood.
| OBJ EC TI ON 4: CA N A FE TU S OR IN F A NT BE HA R M ED ?
Giubilini and Minerva hold that a subject can only have a right to X if 'she is harmed by a decision to deprive her of X'. 28 Moreover, an individual can only be harmed if she is in the condition to value the different situation that would have resulted if she had not been harmed. In this context they are referring, of course, to the right to life. Kaczor points out that a consequence of this view is that if someone is painlessly murdered, they are also not in the condition to value the different situation (being dead), and so the victim is not harmed by depriving them of their right to life.
29
Räsänen counters by explaining that Giubilini and Minerva's definition of harm requires that an individual must be 'in a condition to value different situations before that harm occurs, not after'. 30 Giubilini and Minerva do not explicitly state this, but they do say that if 'an individual is capable of making any aims (like actual human and non-human persons), she is harmed if she is prevented from accomplishing her aims by being killed', 31 so it is a reasonable interpretation. It follows that because an infant or fetus is not able to value situations, it cannot be harmed by depriving it of its right to life.
Räsänen is correct that Kaczor's scenario is not applicable to this understanding of harm, but fails to realize that in subsequent chapters has been harmed, even though they could not value one situation over another at the time of the harm.
Kaczor also has much to say about conscious desires as the basis for harm. He clarifies that for those who hold Räsänen's position, these desires must be dispositional, rather than actual or potential, so that whether in sleep or a coma, we retain our dispositional desires. Again, this seems ad hoc, but is a necessary distinction as we would not want to deny a person's desire to live just because they are asleep or in a temporary coma. Kaczor raises Beckwith's scenario of two patients in temporary comas, one of whom, Bob, must relearn everything when he emerges from the coma because of brain trauma. Bob has no dispositional desires to live, and so according to Räsänen's criteria, has no right to life. Kaczor points out that the 'distinction between a human being in a temporary coma who will recover old desires, and a human being in a temporary coma who will acquire new desires is of no real importance '. 37 This casts doubt on dispositional desires being morally decisive.
There is a further issue with a desire-based account. Unless we are to consider that a heart-broken teenager who no longer wants to live has no right to life, our criteria must be based on ideal desires, not actual desires. But Kaczor notes that this distinction is morally impor- 
| CON CL U S I ONS
Räsänen has criticized four objections Kaczor offers to Giubilini and Minerva's defense of infanticide. We have argued that these objections, taken in isolation, do not comprise a full representation of Kaczor's case against infanticide. Although Kaczor is primarily developing a case against abortion, the majority of his arguments are also applicable to infanticide, and when combined with his four objections, present a powerful case for it being morally impermissible. Räsänen concludes by stating 'if we want to reject the permissibility of infanticide, we must find better arguments for it'. 41 We disagree strongly on several points. We have explained in detail how Kaczor in fact provides excellent arguments for rejecting infanticide, contrary to this claim.
Additionally, permitting infanticide is a hugely controversial position that is against the status quo. The burden of proof is on proponents such as Räsänen to find better arguments in favor of it.
